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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Brian N. Pratt appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdicts 
finding him guilty of two counts of delivery of a controlled substance and one 
count of trafficking in a controlled substance. Pratt contends the district court 
erred in denying his motion for mistrial based on a prospective juror's comment 
made during voir dire. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The Lewiston Police Department received information that Pratt was 
involved in the distribution of methamphetamine. (PSI, p.3.) An officer then 
enlisted a confidential informant to purchase methamphetamine from Pratt on 
two occasions. (Id.) After receiving additional information that Pratt was still in 
possession of a large quantity of methamphetamine, the officer applied for and 
obtained a search warrant for a shop rented by Pratt. (Id.) The subsequent 
search of that shop revealed additional methamphetamine and items indicative of 
drug distribution. (PSI, pp.3-4.) The state charged Pratt with two counts of 
delivery of methamphetamine, one count of trafficking in methamphetamine, and 
the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.64-66.) 
During the jury selection process prior to Pratt's jury trial, a prospective 
juror indicated that he knew Pratt. (See Tr., p.46, L.13 - p.47, L.4.) The 
prosecutor asked the prospective juror, "without telling me exactly the nature of 
your relationship with Mr. Pratt, would that relationship cause you concern about 
sitting in this case as-." (Tr., p.47, Ls.1-4.) The prospective juror responded, "I 
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don't know about this case, but I got in trouble awhile back and same thing [sic] 
that he's in trouble kind of for. That's how I know him." (Tr., p.47, Ls.5-8.) The 
prosecutor did not inquire further about Pratt's relationship with or knowledge of 
the defendant, and requested that the prospective juror be excused for cause. 
(Tr., p.47, Ls.9-18.) The district court granted this request, and voir dire 
continued. (Tr., p.47, L.21 -p.48, L.15.) 
At some point later, Pratt moved for a mistrial on the ground that the 
prospective juror's comment tainted the jury pool. (See Supp Tr.) The court 
took the matter up outside the presentence of the jury. (Id.) After directing the 
court clerk to read the prospective juror's comment into the record, and hearing 
argument from the parties, the district court denied Pratt's motion for a mistrial. 
(Id.) 
The jury found Pratt guilty of all three charges. (R., pp.187-188.) The 
state later withdrew the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.234-
237.) The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of five years with 
two years fixed for each of the two delivery convictions, and a consecutive unified 
sentence of 20 years with 10 years fixed for the trafficking conviction. (R., 
pp.255-258.) Pratt timely appealed. (R., pp.263-266.) 
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ISSUE 
Pratt states the issue on appeal as: 
Was Mr. Pratt's constitutional right to a fair trial with an impartial jury 
violated when the district court failed to give a curative instruction 
and denied Mr. Pratt's motion for a mistrial following a potential 
juror's disclosure that he knew Mr. Pratt from a previous incident in 
which the prospective juror "got in trouble and [for the] same thing 
that [Mr. Pratt]'s in trouble for"? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 




Pratt Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Motion For A 
Mistrial 
A Introduction 
Pratt contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
motion for a mistrial. (See generally Appellant's brief.) Specifically, Pratt 
contends that a prospective juror's comment about the defendant tainted the jury 
pool and violated his right to an impartial jury. (Id.) Application of the correct 
legal standards shows that Pratt's claim fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal, the standard for review of a motion for mistrial is well-
established: 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably 
exercised his discretion in light of the circumstances existing when 
the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be 
whether the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial 
represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full 
record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a 
criminal case, the "abuse of discretion" standard is a misnomer. The 
standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible error. [The 
appellate court's] focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of 
the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's 
refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, 
viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error. 
State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993) (citations 
omitted). Pratt bears the burden of showing that the trial court committed 
reversible error when it denied his motion for a mistrial. State v. Rodriquez, 106 
Idaho 30, 67 4 P.2d 1029 (Ct. App. 1983). The appellate court reviews the full 
record to determine if the event that triggered the motion for mistrial "represented 
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reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record." Rodriquez, 106 
Idaho at 33,674 P.2d at 1032. 
When evaluating a claim that the trial court has abused its discretion, the 
sequence of the appellate court's inquiry is first, whether the trial court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; second, whether the trial court acted 
within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices availability to it; and finally, whether 
the trial court reached its discretion by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley 
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 
(1991). 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Pratt's Motion 
For A Mistrial 
A mistrial is appropriate where there has been conduct, inside or outside 
of the courtroom, that is "prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant 
of a fair trial." I.C.R. 29.1 (a). Thus, the event triggering the mistrial motion must 
be both prejudicial and deprive the defendant of a fair trial in order to warrant a 
mistrial. 
Although a criminal defendant is entitled to a fair jury panel, it is sufficient 
that the jurors may render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court 
instead of information gathered outside of that evidence. Murphy v. Florida, 421 
U.S. 794, 795 (1975) (quoting Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961 )). The purpose 
of voir dire is to discover if potential jurors are not qualified to sit as jurors, and a 
defendant is not entitled to a mistrial based on statements by potential jurors in 
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voir dire unless there is a "continuing impact on the trial." State v. Laymon, 140 
Idaho 768, 771, 101 P.3d 712, 715 (Ct. App. 2004) (no continuing impact due to 
curative instruction). Jurors are presumed to be impartial. State v. Ellington, 151 
Idaho 53, 69, 253 P.3d 727, 743 (2011) (citing Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 
86 (1988)). 
Pratt has failed to demonstrate that the prospective juror's vague 
comments about the prospective juror's own criminal history and knowledge of 
the defendant had a continuing impact on the trial. Pratt has therefore failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a 
mistrial. 
Pratt moved for a mistrial after the prospective juror stated that he "got in 
trouble awhile back and same thing [sic] that [Pratt] was in trouble kind of for" 
and that that was how he knew Pratt. (Tr., p.47, Ls.5-8; Supp. Tr., p.7, L.2 - p.8, 
L.19.) After instructing the court clerk to read the prospective juror's comment 
into the record, and after hearing argument from the parties outside of the 
presence of the jury, the district court denied the motion, concluding: 
I think at this point in time there has not been sufficient information 
brought before the jury panel that I think we would -- is something 
that could not be dealt with by way of a limiting instruction if 
necessary. I don't believe there have been adequate grounds 
shown at this time for the granting of a mistrial. [The prospective 
juror] did go far in his answer and if we could have perhaps 
controlled a little bit, but he indicated that he had been charged and 
that he knew Mr. Pratt through his prior action, but he doesn't really 
make direct accusations against Mr. Pratt for having been involved 
with delivery of controlled substance or anything of that nature. 
So I think we can deal with it adequately through the limiting 
instructions that I'm going to be providing to the jury once sworn, 
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and so I'm going to deny the motion for mistrial and we can 
proceed with the jury selection back in Courtroom 1. 
(Supp Tr., p.7, L.16 - p.9, L.24.) 
The court was aware of its discretion and reasonably considered the 
arguments of the parties. The prospective juror's vague comment did not 
specifically implicate Pratt in any prior criminal activity, or express any knowledge 
or belief that Pratt was guilty in the present case. The prospective juror was not 
questioned further about his relationship with and knowledge of the defendant, 
and was excused for cause. (Tr., p.47, L.9 - p.48, L.15.) The brief vague 
comment was not so inflammatory or potentially prejudicial that Pratt can now 
show that it had a continuing impact on his trial. The prospective juror may have 
known Pratt in some collateral capacity that was based upon the prospective 
juror's own previous drug history, but not Pratt's. This Court should not assume 
that the jury took the most damaging and most prejudicial possible inference from 
the comment - that Pratt had actually engaged in previous drug trafficking or 
delivery. 
After the court denied the motion for mistrial, it appears that Pratt did not 
request, and the district court did not provide, a specific curative instruction 
regarding the prospective juror's comment. Thus, any distinct claim that the 
district court failed to give a more specific curative instruction is not preserved 
and may not be considered on appeal. State v. Miller, 130 Idaho 550, 553, 944 
P.2d 147, 150 (Ct. App. 1997) ("A request for a limiting instruction should be 
specific and timely" (citations omitted)); State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 
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P.2d 123, 126 (1992) (Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered 
for the first time on appeal). 
While Pratt did not request a specific a curative instruction, the court did 
provide standard general limiting instructions after the jury was sworn. (Tr., p.98, 
L.12 - p.108, L.10.) These instructions included admonishments for the jury to 
consider only the evidence presented to it during the trial, and to not allow 
sympathy or prejudice to influence its deliberations. (Tr., p.101, Ls.16-23.) The 
court defined evidence as consisting of "the testimony of the witnesses, exhibits 
offered and received, and any stipulated or admitted facts." (Tr., p.101, L.23 -
p.102, L.1.) It is presumed the jury followed these instructions. State v. Thumm, 
153 Idaho 533, 544, 285 P.3d 348, 359 (Ct. App. 2012). 
The prospective juror's vague comment in this case was not as 
inflammatory or as potentially prejudicial as comments in other cases where 
Idaho appellate courts have considered similar issues and found no reversible 
error. See Ellington, 151 Idaho at 68-69, 253 P.3d at 742-743 (three prospective 
jurors - including one who had talked with a member of the victims' family about 
the charged crimes - expressed their belief that Ellington was guilty); Laymon, 
140 Idaho 768, 101 P.3d 712 (Ct. App. 2004); (prospective juror referred to 
defendant's prior drug charge and previously scheduled trial and stated, "If he's 
guilty last week, he'll be guilty next week"); State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 7 47, 751, 
947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997) (prospective juror referred to defendant as a 
pedophile in "outburst"). 
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Several courts in other jurisdictions have similarly declined to find any 
basis for reversal where prospective jurors have made vague statements about a 
defendant's past. See U.S. v. Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838, 842-843 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(affirming denial of motion for mistrial and court's refusal to strike entire jury panel 
where prospective juror who was a corrections officer stated that he occasionally 
entered jail cells and that the defendants' faces looked "slightly familiar" to him); 
Mitchell v. Georgia, 644 S.E.2d 147, 148-149 (Ga. App. 2007) (affirming denial of 
motion for mistrial where prospective juror stated she worked in the jail and "had 
seen papers" on the defendant); Missouri v. Lacy, 851 S.W.2d 623, 630-631 (Mo. 
App. 1993) (affirming denial of motion to quash the jury panel where prospective 
juror stated that "he knew [defendant] from dealings with him and his family in an 
apartment complex about two miles from where the crime had been committed, 
and that he had predetermined ideas about the case"); Miller v. Florida, 847 
So.2d 1093, 1096-1097 (Fla. App. 2003) (affirming denial of motion for mistrial 
where prospective juror stated, "I think I know [the defendant]. I think I waited on 
him in a business that I had at one time. I was watching him. I would think he 
was guilty."). 
Because Pratt has failed to show the prospective juror's comment had any 
continuing impact on his trial, he has failed to establish error in the district court's 
denial of his motion for mistrial. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Pratt's convictions for 
two counts of delivery of a controlled substance and one count of trafficking in a 
controlled substance. 
DATED this 22nd day of October, 2014. 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of October, 2014, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
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ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
MWO/pm 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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